

All Figures for Dr. Chichilnisky's Book:

Figure 1.1




Figure 1.2a

## Computer models match observed $\Delta T$ on all continents

Black lines are decadal averaged observations. Blue bands are computer models with natural forcings only. Pink bands are computer models with human + natural forcings.





Figure 1.2b



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
## SEA LEVEL RISE

A significant sea level rise is one of the major anticipated consequences of climate change (IPCC, 2007; UNEP 2007).

Global warming from increasing greenhouse gas concentrations is a significant driver of both contributions to sea-level rise. From 1955 to 1995, ocean thermal expansion is estimated to have contributed about 0.4 mm per year to sea level rise, less than 25 per cent of the observed rise over the same period. For the 1993 to 2003 decade, for which the best data are available, thermal expansion is estimated to be significantly larger, at about 1.6 mm per year for the upper 750 m of the ocean alone, about 50 per cent of the observed sea level rise of 3.1 mm per year. Scientists estimate the melting of glaciers and ice caps (excluding the glaciers covering Greenland and Antarctica) contributed to sea level rise by about 0.3 mm per year from 1961 to 1990 increasing to about 0.8 mm per year from 2001–2004.

Even for today's socio-economic conditions, both regionally and globally, large numbers of people and significant economic activity are exposed to an increase and acceleration of sea level rise. The densely populated megadeltas such as those of Ganges-Brahmaputra, Mekong and Nile are especially vulnerable to sea level rise. Some 75 per cent of the population affected live on the Asian megadeltas and deltas, with a large proportion of the remainder living on deltas in Africa. Globally, at least 150 million people live within 1 metre of high tide level, and 250 million live within 5 metres of high tide (UNEP, 2007).

Figure 14. The projected and observed sea level rise. Observed sea level rise is currently larger than that projected by current climate models. The bar to the left also shows the contribution of different factors to sea level rise, the two most important being a) thermal expansion of ocean waters as they warm, and b) increase in the ocean mass, principally from land-based sources of ice (glaciers and ice caps, and the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica).






Figure 16. Land area, number of people impacted and projected economic losses from a 1 metre uniform sea level rise in different regions (Anthoff *et al.*, 2006; UNEP, 2007).

Figure 1.2c

## Sea ice is receding



Figure 1.2d

## Coastal glaciers are retreating

Muir Glacier, Alaska, 1941-2004

August 1941



August 2004



Figure 1.2e

## Harm is already occurring (continued)

Total power released by tropical cyclones (green) has increased along with sea surface temperatures (blue).




Figure 1.2f

Appendix Figure A.7. Number of Flood Events by Continent and Decade Since 1950 (C16, Fig 16.6)




Figure 1.2g

**Appendix Figure A.8. Number of Major Wild Fires by Continent and Decade Since 1950 (C16, Fig 16.9)**




Figure 1.2h

## Where we're headed: temperate-zone agriculture




Figure 2. Corn and Wheat yields versus temperature increase in the temperate zone averaged across 30 crop modeling studies. All studies assumed a positive change in precipitation. CO<sub>2</sub> direct effects were included in all studies.

Figure 1.3




Figure 1.4





Figure 1.5

The world's forests



Countries with large net changes in forest area 2000–2005





Figure 1.6






Figure 1.8

**Major Previous Mass Extinctions and Resulting Climate Change**

<i>Mass Extinction</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Global Climate Change</i>
<b>Ordovician</b>	440 Million Years Ago	Cooling
<b>Devonian</b>	370 Million Years Ago	Cooling
<b>Permian</b>	245 Million Years Ago	Warming
<b>Triassic</b>	210 Million Years Ago	Warming
<b>Cretaceous</b>	65 Million Years Ago	Brief Cooling Followed by Warming

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Figure 1.9a





Figure 1.9b



**The smoking gun for human influence**

Top panel shows best estimates of human & natural forcings 1880-2005.

Bottom panel shows that state-of-the-art climate model, given these forcings, reproduces almost perfectly the last 125 years of observed temperatures.

Figure 1.9c

# Global Land-Ocean Temperature Anomaly (°C)




Figure 1.10

## Rapidly Increasing Ozone Holes




Figure 1.11




Figure 1.12




Figure 1.13

**Energy Used in the World by Source**




Figure 1.14





Table 2.1

	<b>Cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions (1990 – 2002)</b>	<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions 2002</b>	<b>Population (2002)</b>	<b>GDP (2002)</b>
<b>Developed Nations (OECD)</b>	79.0%	60%	21.5%	79.2%
<b>Developing Nations</b>	21.0%	40%	78.5%	20.8%

Figure 2.1a

# GNI per Capita vs. Carbon Emissions per Capita




Figure 2.1b




Figure 2.1c




Figure 2.2

### World Population Increase After Availability of Penicillin




Figure 2.3




Figure 2.4




Figure 2.5a




Figure 2.5b




Figure 3.1




Figure 3.2

### Relative Fossil Fuel Consumption in Several Nations




Figure 3.3





Figure 3.4

<u>Conflict</u>	<u>Years</u>
Russo-Japanese War	1904 - 1905
World War I	1914 - 1918
Polish-Soviet War	1919 - 1921
Greco-Turkish War	1919 - 1922
Sino-Japanese War	1937 - 1945
World War II	1939 - 1945
French Indochina War	1946 - 1954
First Arab-Israeli War	1948 - 1949
Korean War	1950 - 1953
Vietnam War	1959 - 1975
Soviet War in Afghanistan	1979 - 1989
Iran-Iraq War	1980 - 1988
Persian Gulf War	1990 - 1991
War in Afghanistan	2001 - present
War in Iraq	2003 - present

Figure 3.5

### South Pole Dobson Ozone Spectrophotometer October 15-31 Average




Figure 3.6




Figure 3.7 (Same as 2.3)




Figure 3.8




Figure 3.9




Figure 3.10

### Economic Growth Rates of Latin America and Asia






Figure 3.11

It is not how much you export but what you export



Note: "income content of exports" (EXPY) represents the income level of the typical country with your export basket.

# Rich countries produce “rich country goods”



# The remarkable rise of China






Figure 3.13

**African and South American Exports**



3.14



3.15




Figure 3.15

- (a) Arthur Lewis Economy with Unlimited Labor Supplies
- (b) Heckscher – Ohlin Economy with Fixed Labor Supply
- (c) Chichilnisky North - South Economy

3.16





Figure 3.16

David Ricardo's comparative advantages:

UK and Portugal are better off after trade

3.17



4.1a

This graph corresponds to the regression system in Table 3, column 2. The curve shows the partial relation between the Gini coefficient and the log of per capita GDP, holding fixed the estimated effects of the explanatory variables other than the log of per capita GDP and its square.

### Effect of Income Inequality on Economic Growth




Figure 4.1b

**Table 3: Regression Results for Income Inequality (Kuznets curves)**

Explanatory variable	Dependent Variable				
		Gini coefficient	Country fixed effects	Lowest Quintile	Highest Quintile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(per capita GDP)	0.266** (0.066)	0.292** (0.058)	0.183** (0.067)	-0.063** (0.014)	0.229** (0.050)
log(per capita GDP) squared	-0.0179** (0.0039)	-0.0182** (0.0034)	-0.0121** (0.0040)	0.0037** (0.0008)	-0.0143** (0.0029)
Dummy net income/expend.	-0.0543** (0.0091)	-0.0393** (0.0082)	-0.0426** (0.0080)	0.0100** (0.0020)	-0.0443** (0.0075)
Dummy individual	-0.0188 (0.0099)	-0.0173* (0.0087)	-0.0215* (0.0085)	0.0075** (0.0022)	-0.0095 (0.0080)
Dummy sub-Saharan Africa	--	0.092** (0.014)	--	-0.0217** (0.0034)	0.090** (0.013)
Dummy Latin America	--	0.085** (0.013)	--	-0.0187** (0.0031)	0.066** (0.011)
Dummy former colony	--	0.049** (0.011)	--	-0.0101** (0.0028)	0.0374** (0.0095)
Openness variable	--	0.026* (0.011)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.0012 (0.0026)	0.0154 (0.0089)
Number of observations	54, 78, 91 123, 94	54, 77, 90 120, 92	54, 78, 91 121, 93	47, 85, 81 117, 81	41, 57, 77 115, 81
R-squared	.14, .18, .24 .27, .47	.35, .39, .59 .57, .66	--	.17, .45, .50 .53, .60	.40, .45, .60 .58, .71
s.e. of regression	.092 .093 .096 .098 .073	.080 .081 .070 .075 .059	.054 .047 .044 .070 .046	.019 .016 .017 .016 .015	.065 .062 .054 .066 .045


\*Significant at 5% level

\*\*Significant at 1% level

Notes: See Table 2 for definitions and sources of variables. Dependent variables are Gini coefficients, lowest quintile income shares, or highest quintile income shares, as indicated. Panel systems cover 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Coefficients were estimated by seemingly-unrelated-regression technique. Standard errors of coefficients are in parentheses. Each period has an individual intercept (not shown). For the regression system in column 2, the estimated intercepts, expressed relative to that for the 1960s, are -0.011 (s.e. = 0.012) for the 1970s, -0.018 (0.013) for the 1980s, 0.012 (0.014) for the 1990s, and 0.006 (0.014) for the 2000s. A test that these four relative intercepts are jointly zero has a p-value of 0.011. The system in column 3 includes country fixed effects.

Figure 4.2 and 4.3

### Shares in world exports of goods and services



### Rich countries produce “rich country goods”





Figure 4.2 and 4.3

### Latin America: A comparatively rich region



### Economic freedom index in Latin America




Figure 4.2 and 4.3







Figure 4.4






4.6a



4.6b



4.6c

Green National Accounting: Taking Natural Resources into Consideration (1993)			
Country	GNP per Capita (\$)	GNNP per Capita (\$)	% Fall in GNP
India	293	242	-17.4
South Africa	3,582	2,997	-16.3
China	490	411	-16.1
Indonesia	732	616	-15.8
Brazil	2,936	2,579	-12.2
GNNP (Green Net National Product) is GNP minus the damage from carbon dioxide emissions, depreciation of produced assets and depletion of forests and subsoil assets			






Figure 1. AT EACH PRICE, THE COMMON-PROPERTY SUPPLY EXCEEDS THE PRIVATE-PROPERTY SUPPLY


Chichilnisky, G. "North-South Trade and the Global Environment", American Economic Review, September 1994.




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
5.2 (Same as 2.3)




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
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
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


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


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





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
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
### Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentration




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


5.10




6.1





### 6.3


Abatement - Public Good




In each nation the curved lines indicate the trade – off between the production of private goods and less emissions, or a better atmosphere. Before the carbon market there is no obligation to limit emissions, and both nations consume the maximum amount of private goods they can produce, indicated by the dots on the horizontal axis. Once limits on emissions or “caps” are established, as indicated by the dots on the vertical axis, nation one sells credits and nation 2 buys them. The two nations trade their emissions rights in the carbon market, where the value of their carbon credits traded in terms of private goods is indicated with short dotted lines. In sum: after the carbon market is introduced both nations reach a higher welfare level s consuming at the points indicated “after” rather than “before”, and, in addition, global emissions decrease with abatement level **A**.


7.1

### Energy Used in the World by Source





7.3



7.4

**Property Insurance Premiums on Standard and Catastrophic Risks**

<b>Percentage Paid to Protect Covered Amount</b>		<b>Avg. Premium per \$1000 Protected</b>
Flood <sup>1</sup>	2.2% to 2.8%	\$22 to \$28
Earthquakes <sup>2</sup>	1.0% to 2.2%	\$10 to \$22
Basic Homeowner's <sup>3</sup>	0.2% to 0.7%	\$2 to \$7

7.5

'Clean' Coal and Negative Carbon

AC = Avoided carbon: reduces emissions but carbon concentration continues to increase

RC = Reduced carbon: reduces concentration through air capture of CO<sub>2</sub>




Figure 7.6

Each new GT plant changes the transformation curve between goods and abatement providing more power and increasing carbon abatement






Figure 7.7: A New Coal Plant




7.8

**Figure 7.8: A New Coal Plant Increases Power but Leaves Emissions Unchanged**




7.9


Figure 7.9



7.10





8.1





The dashed vertical line is the price of the 'credits' that an over-consuming nation has to pay in the Kyoto Protocol carbon market. This 'price signal' corrects for the externality due to lack of private property in developing nations, leading to the same market allocation that would occur with private property rights in both nations. The real price of the resource for the importing nation is supply price + credit price. The carbon market leads to less global consumption of resources, and higher real prices for the consumer.

9.1













9.6









9.8




9.9



9.10



10.1a



10.1b

